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PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
1291ST MEETING (AT HEADS OF STATE LEVEL)

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BRIEFING NOTE

THE SITUATION IN LIBYA

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. This Briefing Note provides an update on the evolution of the situation in Libya since the 38th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government held on 15 February 2025 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It covers the developments in the political, security, socio-economic and humanitarian situation in Libya, as well as the state of progress in implementing the Decision adopted by the 38th Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly and in addressing the challenges facing the transition process. It concludes with some observations and a set of recommendations for consideration by the Peace and Security Council.

2. The signature of the ceasefire agreement on 20 October 2020 and the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) of November 2020 put an end to the civil war and paved the way for the transitional phase in Libya that has lasted for more than a decade now.

3. While the ceasefire agreement is still holding, it is not yet fully implemented. The security situation remains volatile and the failure to organize elections that were scheduled for December 2021 has plunged the country in a protracted political stalemate marked, among others, by a serious institutional division between two rival governments: the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU) and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), which has deeply affected the country's political, security and economic stability.

II. POLITICAL SITUATION

4. The political landscape is characterized by a crisis of legitimacy of all state institutions, partly due to the failure to organize elections since 2014, a persistent political stalemate and foreign interference.

i. CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY

5. On one hand, the crisis of legitimacy is negatively impacting on the legislature with its two branches; the House of Representatives (HoR) and the High Council of State (HCS). On the other hand, it is also impacting negatively on Executive governmental authority. This situation is also affecting the Separation of Powers and the system of checks and balances.

a) The House of Representatives

6. The HoR was elected in 2014 as the national parliament with a four-year mandate to oversee a political transition. However, the legitimacy of the 2014 elections was rejected by some members of the previous legislature, that is, the General National Congress (GNC), elected in 2012. They refused to hand over power, leading to a split between warring factions in the east and west of Libya supported by armed factions that launched the military operation known as "Dawn of Libya". This operation sparked the civil war from July 2014 to 20 October 2020.

7. The Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in Sekhirat in 2015 tried to reunite the legislative authority by promoting international recognition for the HoR as the legitimate parliament and the HCS as the consultative second chamber. Nevertheless, the LPA failed stop the fighting and to reunify State institutions as the HoR moved to the East of the country (Al Baidha, then Tobruq and finally Benghazi) and backed east-based governments including the current government of Dr Oussama Hamad.

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8. Critics argue that the mandate and legitimacy of the HoR expired in July 2018. However, it remains the only elected body in the Libyan political landscape. The Speaker of the HoR, Aguila Salah has expressed his willingness to step down if parliamentary elections are organized.

b) High Council of State

9. According to the LPA, the High Council of State (HCS), drawn from members of GNC, is a consultative chamber with an advisory role. Indeed, any constitutional changes, designation of a new government and appointments in sovereign positions require agreement by both chambers. However, Critics argue that the HCS lacks popular legitimacy and merely represented armed groups whose representatives were dismayed at losing the 2014 election. Since 6 August 2024, the leadership of the HCS has been contested when the elections of its chairman came down to a single vote between Khaled Al-Mechri and Mohammed Takala. Khaled Al Mechri claimed that he is the winner of the 2014 elections by 69 votes against 68 votes and Mr Mohamed Takala is claiming the invalidity of the ballot. He rejected the results of the elections and decided to go to the court.

10. Since then, both personalities sit with their supporters in different premises which created a protocol and diplomatic challenge to meet the chairman of the HCS. The African Union Team in charge of the reconciliation has chosen to meet with the chair of the permanent reconciliation committee of the HCS as his position is statuary and does not depend on the elections. The part of the HCS chaired by Mr Takala is backed by the GNU.

11. On 28 May 2025, the Administrative Chamber of Libya's Supreme Court dismissed the case introduced by Mr Takala against Mr Al-Mechri arguing that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the case. The ruling was praised by both parties and considered as a victory. The Speaker of the HoR also welcomed the Supreme Court's decision.

c) The Governmental authority

12. Notably, the Libyan Executive Authorities is represented by the Presidential Council (PC) and the Government of National Unity (GNU) that was selected in February 2021 in Geneva by the UN-brokered Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), according to the LPDF roadmap adopted in November 2020 in Tunis, after the signature of the ceasefire agreement of 20 October 2020.None of the members of the PC (three members representing the East, the West and the South of the country) was competing for the failed elections of December 2021. Also, the LPDF roadmap decided that organizing elections is a task attributed to the GNU. Thus, after the failure of the December 2021 elections, the HoR decided to designate, after submission of the candidatures to the HCS, a new government led by Fathi Bashagha who was replaced later by Oussama Hamad.

13. Since then, Libya has been facing a persistent leadership crisis marked by seemingly irreconcilable differences and divisions between the internationally recognized Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli and led by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Debaiba, and the HoR-designated Government (called the Government of Stability of Libya under Bashagha leadership and currently the Libyan Government) based in Benghazi and led by Prime Minister Oussama Hammad.

14. Even though, the GNU has been selected by the LPDF to end up with parallel institutions and reunify the state institutions, the failure of the December 2021 elections led the country to the same governmental division of the period 2014-2021 between East and West which resulted in institutional fragmentation and absence of a unified budget.

15. Both governments and their backers have divergent positions towards holding national elections. More precisely, they differ on the proposed electoral legislation and the on the formation of a unified interim government to be mainly entrusted with the responsibility of organization of the elections.

16. On the one hand, the camp of the GNU, backed by the segment of Mr Mohamed Takala in the HCS and military formations of western Libya, is against any change of government and has declared its readiness to step down to an elected government. On the other hand, the eastern-based government backed by the HoR and the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Marshall Khalifa Haftar, is claiming the change of government in order to get a unified government also with the main task of organizing elections.

17. The HoR adopted unanimously of electoral laws for Presidential and Parliamentary elections on 2 October 2023. UNSMIL stated that it is "a working basis for the holding of elections and would require the commitment of all parties, especially the major leaders, in good faith".

18. From his side, the President of the PC, Dr Mohamed Younes MENFI issued on 29 April 2025, three decrees described as part of a ''National Rescue Plan'' including a decree on the election of the General Conference for National Reconciliation and a text establishing the National Referendum and Information Commission. He further requested the High National Elections Commission (HNEC) to take practical steps, by the end of June 2025, to implement the referendum on the constitution, to submit the HoR decision to extend its own mandate to a referendum, and to take legal measures to fill the vacant seats in the HoR.

19. The decision of President MENFI, has been rejected by the vice-President of the PC Abdallah Al-Lafi and the Speaker of the HoR, Aguila Salah who accused the PC of "encroaching" on legislative authority. The Prime Minister of the GNU, Debaiba, decided to transmit the three Decrees of the PC to the HoR and the HCS while the speaker of the HoR, is clamouring for the formation of a new government.

20. On 4 February 2025, in an attempt to pave the way towards elections, UNSMIL established an Advisory Committee of a diverse group of Libyan independent personalities to address outstanding issues hindering the holding of elections in Libya. The report of the Committee has been published by UNSMIL on 6 May 2025. It outlined four options regarding conducting elections and ending the transitional phase: (1) holding presidential and legislative elections simultaneously; (2) holding parliamentary elections first, followed by the drafting and adoption of a permanent constitution; (3) adopting a permanent constitution before elections; and (4) establishing a political dialogue committee, based on the Libyan Political Agreement, to finalize electoral laws, executive authority, and the permanent constitution. The four options are submitted for discussions with the political and social components of Libya.

21. However, on the international front, Russia has emphasized within the UN Security Council, that the recommendations of the Advisory Committee should remain technical and serve only to inform the Special Representative of the UNSG. During the last meeting of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya (IFCL), held in Berlin on 19-20 June 2025 at the level of Senior Officials, Turkye requested the exclusion of option number four.

d) National Reconciliation

22. Since 2011, the African Union (AU) efforts in Libya have been concentrated on the mediation and reconciliation of Libya. The AU has continued to reaffirm its commitment to respect the unity,

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national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Through the High-Level Committee on Libya (HLC), chaired since 2016 by HE Denis Sassou N'Guessou, President of the Republic of Congo, the AU adopted a roadmap that starts with holding the National Reconciliation Conference and ends by the holding of national elections (HLC 4th Summit, 9 September 2017).

23. Paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of the Berlin Conference I (January 2020) assigned the leadership of the reconciliation process to the AU. Thus, the AU efforts to support the Presidential Council (PC) led to the formation of a Libyan Preparatory Committee (LPC) for the National Reconciliation Conference where all main actors are represented. The LPC held five meetings (from July 2023 to February 2024) and decided to hold the National Reconciliation Conference in Sirte on 28 April 2024. Furthermore, the LPC launched the "Brazzaville call for the acceleration of the Peace and Reconciliation Process in Libya" (Brazzaville, 5 February 2024).

24. On 20 March 2024, at the wake of the National Reconciliation Conference, the Eastern components of the Preparatory Committee, including some representatives of the President of the PC MENFI, decided to suspend their participation blaming the Vice-President of the PC, Al-Lafi of non-observation of neutrality.

25. Two High Level visits to Libya took place to encourage Libyans to take part to a meeting in Addis-Ababa where the Libyan stakeholders will be invited to agree on a national charter of reconciliation. The first High- level visit (Tripoli 10-11 October 2024), was conducted by H.E. President Mohamed Ould Sheikh Al-Gazouani of Mauritania, Chair of the Year 2024 of the AU and the second visit (Tripoli and Benghazi 9-11 December 2024) was led by H.E. President Denis Sassou N'guessou.

26. All Libyan main actors accepted the invitation of President Denis Sassou N'guessou to take part at the signing ceremony of the National Reconciliation Charter in Addis-Ababa. However, some of them decided, at the last moment not to sign the Charter.

27. The National Reconciliation Charter was signed by Representatives of the President of the PC, Dr Menfi, the Vice-President of the PC, Moussa Al-Kouny, the Representatives of Saif Al-Islam Kaddafi and the Representatives of both chambers of the legislative authority (the HoR and the HCS).The text of the reconciliation charter has been prepared by the Libyans themselves. They included a paragraph that allows the adherence of more Libyan actors at any time.

ii. REGIONAL CONTEXT

28. Since 2011, geopolitical tensions continue to negatively impact on efforts to resolve the Libyan crisis as the country has been drawn into regional and international disputes over spheres of influence, oil deposits and arms deals. Many key political actors rely on foreign backing either for both military and political support. Financially, Libya is still a relatively rich country even though its economy is weakened by the prolonged transition. Nevertheless, some actors have attracted foreign backers through financial deals.

29. Furthermore, in the absence of unified state institutions, international support for Libya is not coordinated and parallel actors are gaining recognition and making private deals taking full advantage of the current incoherence of international support.

30. Turkye has signed two controversial MoUs with the Western Libya authorities. The first MoU, on the delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean Sea, was signed, in November 2019, with the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Faiez Al Sarraj, in order to establish an exclusive economic zone. The second MoU was signed, in October 2022, between Turkye and the

Government of National Unity (GNU) on energy exploration. Since 2019, Turkish regular troops have been deployed in the western part of the country. Turkye is claiming the existence of military cooperation based on an international agreement signed with the recognised authorities.

31. Also, Syrian fighters have been brought to Libya since 2019 and military drones are possibly installed in some areas of the west of the country added to Al-Witya airbase where foreign military personnel are deployed.

32. Both above-mentioned MoUs have been controversial and drew widespread rejection by the HoR, the LNA, the European Union, the League of Arab States, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, France, UAE, among others. They have been considered as violating the international Law of the sea, as they have been signed by transitional authorities without legal mandate and impeding on third countries rights.

33. The position of the HoR is reportedly shifting towards the MoU signed with Turkye as a parliamentary committee is currently examining it with the purpose of ratification. This is the outcome of growing cooperation between the Western authorities and Turkye.

34. In late June 2025, Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) signed an MoU with the Turkish state-owned oil company TPAO to conduct geological and geophysical surveys in four offshore zones, a move that prompted statements from Greece and the EU, followed by counter-statements from Turkye and Libya.

35. Recently, Greece has officially launched an international tender for hydrocarbon exploration in four offshore blocks south of Crete and the Peloponnese, with the notice published in the Official Journal of the European Union. The Hellenic authorities underlined the strategic significance of the Crete blocks in cancelling “the illegal Turkish-Libyan maritime MoU”.

36. The diplomatic tensions between Turkye and Greece have been fueled by the decision of Greece to deploy three warships in the Eastern Mediterranean between Turkye and Libya, citing the need to control the flow of migrants coming from Libya. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Libya and met with the general commander of the LNA, Marshall Khalifa Haftar, on 6 July 2025, in Benghazi. The ratification of the Libyan-Turkish maritime and energy MoU is likely on the agenda of the discussions.

37. On 8 July 2025, the Benghazi government refused entry to a European delegation—comprising the interior ministers of Italy and Malta, along with Greece’s immigration minister and the EU commissioner for internal affairs and migration—declaring them personae non gratae and ordering them to leave Libyan territory. Before heading to Benghazi, the European delegation made a stop in Tripoli, where it held talks with the GNU’s authorities.

38. Some countries remain concerned about Russia’s growing presence in the eastern part of Libya under Haftar’s control. However, Russia blames Libya’s current instability on the NATO-led military intervention in 2011 and accuses Western countries of pursuing economic interests, particularly exploitation of Libya’s oil reserves.

39. In this context, the warrying parties in Libya are provided with weapons, thus making the country an open market for arms which is affecting the security of neighbouring countries. Indeed, the LNA has been accused of supplying weapons to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan and attacking camps of the Sudanese Army of Al Borhan.

iii. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

a) African Union Efforts

40. On 17 May 2025, the AU Commission Chairperson, H.E. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, issued a statement expressing deep concern over the armed clashes that broke out in Tripoli. He emphasised the need for "demilitarising Tripoli and calling for National responsibility and engagement in a comprehensive political process to end Libya's prolonged transition". On 23 May2025, the AUPSC devoted its 1280th meeting to an emergency session to address the escalating crisis in Libya. The PSC condemned the recent violence in the capital Tripoli, urged unconditional and permanent ceasefire and called for an inclusive Reconciliation in Libya, in accordance with the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, signed on 14 April, 2025, between the Libyan stakeholders as part of the AU's ongoing efforts to support the political process in Libya. During the meeting, the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security H.E. Ambassador Bankole Adeoye, reaffirmed the unwavering commitment of the AU to continue to accompany the Libyan people in their efforts aimed at finding a lasting solution to the challenges facing their country.

b) United Nations

41. On 17 May 2025, the UNSC also held a meeting that was devoted to the Libyan crisis. The members of the Security Council reaffirmed their strong commitment to an inclusive political process led and owned by Libyans, facilitated by the United Nations, as well as to the unification of all institutions, including military and security institutions. They reaffirmed their support to the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and the efforts of the SRSG in this regard. They also reaffirmed their respect for Libya's sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity. League of Arab States

c) European Union

42. On the occasion of the 34th Ordinary Session of the Arab League Summit, held in Baghdad, on 17 May 2025, the League of Arab States affirmed its full support for the State of Libya and the resolution of the crisis in Libya through national dialogue in a manner that preserves the unity of the state, achieves the aspirations of its people and its permanent stability, and rejects all forms of interference in its internal affairs. They expressed full support for Libya's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the cessation of interference in its internal affairs, as well as the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from its territory within a specific timeframe.

d) European Union

43. The EU supports the political dialogue process led by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and participates in the international coordination efforts led by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), but its efforts are more focused on cooperating with all Libyan authorities on the issue of combatting illegal migration. On 20 June 2025, the Meeting of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya-IFCL, was held in Berlin (first meeting of IFCL since October 2021). The participants reaffirmed their commitment to Libya's sovereignty, independence, and unity, urging all international actors to refrain from interference. The IFCL commended Libyan efforts towards national reconciliation and the African Union's constructive role. The participants expressed their grave concern over recent armed clashes, particularly in Tripoli. They also welcomed the establishment of the Truce Committee and the Security Arrangements Committee. The Berlin meeting once again underscored the persistent and profound divisions among the various external

actors involved in the Libyan crisis, along with their overlapping support for the two opposing internal factions—based in the East and the West.

e) Neighboring Countries

44. Algeria has expressed deep concern over renewed armed clashes in Tripoli and called all stakeholders to resort to dialogue as the only option for lastingly resolve the crisis, under the supervision of the UN. The African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3+) convened a UNSC meeting dedicated for the developments in the Libyan crisis.

45. Egypt has expressed deep concern over the ongoing developments in Libya and urged all parties to exercisese the utmost degree of self-restraint. At the same time, Egypt has launched a repatriation operation for its nationals living in Tripoli.

46. Tunisia called for an immediate halt to the escalation in Libya, and expressed its readiness to host a Libyan dialogue under UN auspices in order to reach a political solution and stop the violence.

47. On 10 June 2025, the Sudanese Army issued an official statement indicating that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had launched a coordinated attack on Sudanese border posts located within the Sudan-Egypt-Libya border triangle, with the "direct support of Khalifa Haftar's Libyan Forces". The National Libyan Army argued that the "allegations of seizing Sudanese territory and siding with one of the parties to the conflict is a repeated narrative that has nothing to do with reality".

48. The Tripartite Ministerial Meeting in Cairo: The recent worrying developments in the Libyan crisis have pushed the three neighbouring countries of Libya (Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt) to reactivate their consultation mechanism on Libya, following the cessation of its meetings since 2019. The meeting of the MFAs of the three countries, held in Cairo on May 31, 2025, adopted a final communiqué which «urged all Libyan parties to prioritize the interests of the Libyan people and demanded a consensus among the Libyan parties, under the supervision of the UN and the support of the neighbouring countries, which would end the division and ensure a political process to lead to parliamentary and presidential elections». The meeting stressed «the need to continue supporting the efforts of the Joint Military Committee (5+5) to consolidate the existing ceasefire, ensure the withdrawal of all foreign forces, foreign fighters, and mercenaries within a specified timeframe, and reunify military and security institutions, in full harmony with ongoing efforts within UN, African, Arab, and Mediterranean frameworks».

49. United States of America: The Senior Advisor for Africa in the Department of State, Massad Boulos revealed that Washington was seeking to launch a new approach to resolve the Libyan crisis based on gathering all parties around a single dialogue table with the aim of reviving the stalled political process, stressing that the current stalemate cannot continue and that the US Administration is keen to support Libya's stability to serve the interests of its people.

III. SECURITY SITUATION

50. The mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1970 of 2011 was renewed until 15 May 2026 (UNSC resolution 2769). The resolution also included modifications of the arms embargo as the UNSC expressed its readiness to consider the sale, supply or transfer to Libya of military equipment, for the reunified and joint military units, under the auspices of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission (JMC) and the two Chiefs of Staff, once their formation is complete, as an initial step in the overall reunification of Libya’s military and security

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institutions. However, the UN and the Security Working Group of the IFCL of the Berlin process have so far failed to convene a meeting of both chiefs of staff and the 5+5 JMC.

51. On 29 May 2025, the UNSC adopted resolution 2780, renewing for six months, the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo imposed on the country in resolution 1970. In this context, on 31 March 2020, the EU decided to launch, Operation IRINI in the Mediterranean aimed at implementing the UN arms embargo on Libya by using aerial, satellite and maritime assets. Its mandate has been recently renewed for two years by the European Council (March 2027). Nevertheless, sophisticated weapons, heavy weapons and artillery continue to flow into the country, thus constituting a serious threat to the stability of the region.

52. In his war against "parallel military and security forces", the Prime Minister of the GNU Debaiba declared that the war against the armed groups that are not willing to adhere to the state institutions (they have to choose whether to join the Ministry of Interior or the Ministry of Defence) is still ongoing. Since March 2025, Tripoli has witnessed a military build.

53. In an attempt to address the escalating tensions, the Presidential Council (PC) warned against any unauthorised military manoeuvres towards Tripoli and established mater a truce committee supervised by the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Army (west of the country).

54. While the attack was expected to start against the Special Deterrence Force (SDF) known also as Radaa, controlling Mitiga Airport, Mitiga Prison, Tripoli port and other state institutions, the military confrontations broke out, on 12 May 2025, with the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) operating under the authority of the Presidential Council following the assassination of its commander, Abdel Ghani al-Kikli and his escorts in a military camp of the 444th Combat Brigade operating under the GNU.

55. The clashes took place in densely populated areas in Abu Slim city and the surroundings during three hours and heavy weapons have been used. The Ministry of Defence declared the mission successfully completed adding that the GNU will put an end to all parallel military or security forces.

56. The PM Debaiba decided a package of security reform decisions such as dismantling some armed factions, disbanding the Anti-Illegal Migration Agency, moving some camps to the suburbs of Tripoli such as the Judicial Police Authority and dismissing some commanders of many armed factions.

57. On 18 May 2025, in the presence of the UN SRSG Hannah Teteh, President MENFI, launched, a mechanism to consolidate the truce, enhance stability in the capital, and support security arrangements that lead to a lasting calm.

58. Despite the current relative calm in Tripoli, the SDF is reinforcing its readiness to a possible war with the GNU armed groups. The SDF entrenched in the most important area in Tripoli (Soug Al Jumaa) and widely supported by its inhabitants, is not willing to join the GNU forces. Rumours about indirect negotiations did not lead to any peaceful solution as the SDF was requested to removes its forces from the security squares under their control. Indeed, a resumption of the fighting can happen any time while protests demanding the departure of the GNU continue from time to time.

59. PM Debaiba asked the militias operating out of the authority of the GNU to hand over the criminals to the General Prosecutor, to hand over Mitiga Airport, Mitiga Prison, Tripoli port to the state institutions and to dissolve the militias threatening that those who will not comply with these

conditions will suffer the consequences. The target of these measures is Radaa militia whose supporters mainly from Soug Al Jumaa area perceived to be ready for any military confrontations.

IV. ECONOMIC SITUATION

60. According to the World Bank, Libya's economy showed promising signs of recovery in 2024. Nevertheless, the economy is permanently challenged by its reliance on hydrocarbons which constitute 97% of exports, more than 90% of fiscal revenues, and 68% of GDP. For instance, in 2024 the economy contracted by 0.6 percent because of the 6 percent decline in oil GDP. Furthermore, the political and security instability is negatively affecting the economy including the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) Crisis in August 2024. Sovereign institutions, namely, the CBL and the NOC are obliged to pilot internal political rivalries knowing that more than 70% of the main national product (oil and gas) is driven by the Eastern authorities and the budget is released by the CBL in Tripoli. This situation underscores the need for structural reforms to boost non-oil sectors and address the political instability and the volatile security situation.

61. Amid ongoing political instability, a weakened dinar, declining foreign reserves and Libya's ability to finance imports, the Governor of the CBL agreed, on 2 July 2025, with the chairman of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) on the need for stronger coordination and financial mobilisation, including through the Libyan Foreign Bank and international banks.

62. The CBL stated that an increase of 247,000 barrels per day could generate an additional $6 billion in annual revenue. The country currently produces around 1.4 million barrels per day, having reached a peak of 1.23 million barrels in May 2025 (the highest level in over a decade) and the government aims to raise output to 1.6 million barrels per day by the end of 2025, and to 2 million by 2027.

63. According to the CBL Governor the expansion of the public expenditure by both governments exacerbated the rising level of public debt. This expanded spending has generated an increasing demand of foreign currency, contributing to the widening imbalance between demand and supply of foreign currencies, and preventing the CBL from achieving its goals of maintaining exchange rate stability and increasing the value of the Libyan Dinar (LYD).

64. In this context, in April 2025, the CBL announced, a 13.3% devaluation of the Libyan dinar (LYD) against foreign currencies, setting the new exchange rate at 5.5677 dinars per US dollar. The reaction of the black market was to raise the exchange rate of one USD from around 6 LYD to more than 7LYD. The purchasing power of the citizens has been widely affected.

65. On 30 June 2025, the CBL announced, that during its recent recall of the old LYD 50-dinar notes (second series) printed by the eastern based authorities in Russia, it had discovered more than LD 3.5 billion in counterfeit notes. The bank said that printing these bank notes in large quantities outside its control negatively affected the value of the LYD, contributed to increasing the demand for foreign currencies at significant levels in the parallel / black market and doubled the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing.Meanwhile, the eastern based Libyan authorities printed their separate bank notes in Russia – in contravention of the CBL's rules and regulations.

V. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

66. The fragmentation of power between two governments laid the ground for a low leverage of accountability as affiliated armed groups and militias to both governments operate with impunity, increasing repression against civic groups and freedom of speech.

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67. The takeover of the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA) facilities and premises by the GNU forces, in May 2025, revealed gross human rights violations uncovered at official and unofficial detention facilities run by the SSA force in Tripoli. Dozens of bodies have been discovered at these sites, along with the discovery of suspected instruments of torture and abuse, and potential evidence of extrajudicial killings.

68. Between 18 and21 May 2025, the UN Human Rights Office received information on the excavation of 10 charred bodies at the SSA headquarters in Abu Salim, along with the discovery of a total of 67 bodies in refrigerators at the Abu Salim and Al Khadra hospitals. Some of the remains are said to be in an advanced state of decomposition due to power outages in the hospital. A burial site was also reportedly discovered at the SSA-run Tripoli Zoo.

69. Torture and forced disappearances are frequently reported in Libya. The kidnapping and forced disappearance of activists, politicians and citizens continue to be one of the concerns of human rights. The investigation led by the General Prosecutor on the disappearance of the member of the HoR, Ibrahim Al-Dressi, since 18 May 2024 after assisting to a military parade in Benghazi, did not yet allow to find out his fate. Few days, before his disappearance he had criticized the Eastern authorities.

70. Even though, the SSA militia of Al-Kikli is accused of multiple grave violations of human rights including detaining private jails where people could disappear for year or forever without trials, some observers and a part of the public opinion qualified his assassination as extrajudicial killing.

71. From the side of the anti-GNU armed groups, an ally of the SSA and SDF (Radaa), Oussama Najim, a senior official in Judicial Police, is subject of an arrest warrant issued, on 18 May 2024, by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The arrest warrants listed crimes against humanity and war crimes including: violations of personal dignity, cruel treatment, torture, rape and sexual violence, intentional homicide, unlawful imprisonment, persecution, among others. The crimes have been committed by Najim personally, on his orders, or with assistance from members of the SDF (Radaa), officially known as the Deterrence Apparatus for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, at Mitiga Airport Prison from 15 February 2015 onward against detainees including migrants and refugees. Najim was arrested on 20 January 2025 in Italy and “unexpectedly” released and allowed to return to Libya on 21 January 2025.

72. The Registrar of the ICC confirmed receipt of a declaration by Libya pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute to accept the jurisdiction of the Court from 2011 until the end of 2027. In addition, illegal migration continues to present a grave humanitarian concern as Libya remain a key destination and transit country for African migrants. The major part of the African migrant, refugees and asylum seekers are driven by instability across the continent. For instance, following the outbreak of the war in Sudan, UNHCR estimated that over 313,000 Sudanese refugees have arrived in Libya.

73. African migrants trying to reach Europe are sent by human traffickers and smugglers across the Mediterranean in unsafe, overcrowded vessels. Approximately, thirty thousand African migrants reportedly died or disappeared while crossing the sea to reach the northern Mediterranean coasts since 2015.

74. Once captured in the sea or elsewhere, many African illegal migrants are placed in detention centres. IOM and UNHCR stopped since, 2023, the donations and assistance to the Libyan detention centres under the pretext of discouraging the Libyan authorities of detaining the illegal migrants. Since then, the financial resources of the detention centres have been remarkably affected. UNHCR and IOM advocate for alternatives to detention access to solutions such as resettlement, evacuation, and other safe pathways.

75. The Tripartite Task Force on Migration (AU-UN-EU) led by the AU established in 2017 by the leadership of the three International Organizations, succeeded to repatriate thousands of African Stranded Migrants on the basis of voluntary return. However, the mechanism needs to be revitalized and reviewed.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

76. From the foregoing the PSC may wish to consider the following recommendations, namely:

i. Urging all political and security actors in Libya to use their leadership and authority to respect the agreed truces, to refrain from any move that could lead to security escalation, to protect and fulfil the human rights of all Libyans and migrants;

ii. Encouraging the Libyan signatories of the cease fire agreement of 20 October 2020 to fully implement the provisions of the agreement including the exit of the foreign forces, foreign fighters and mercenaries from the Libyan territory;

iii. Commending the Chair of the High-Level Committee (HLC) on Libya for the tremendous work that produced the Libyan Reconciliation charter signed in Addis-Ababa on 14 February 2025;

iv. Encouraging the AU-Team under the leadership of the Chair of the HLC to continue their efforts on the reconciliation path and to deploy necessary efforts to bring more signatories to the National Reconciliation Charter including the social components such as the elders, tribes, municipalities, CSOs and the private sector;

v. Intensifying the mediation efforts of the AU through AU instruments (Panel of the Wise Femwise) and concretize the visit of the members of the PSC to Libya;

vi. Commending the positive role of HE President Mohamed Younes MENFI, his insight to manage the security difficult conditions and express the support of the AU to the Libyan people;

vii. Calling for an end to foreign interference in the Libyan internal affairs and respect Libya's sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity;

viii. Calling for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from the Libyan territory within a specific timeframe;

ix. Expressing support to the UN-brokered political process aiming to assist Libya to end-up with the transitional phase through holding fair, transparent and democratic elections;

x. Emphasizing the Sanctions Regime Committee's responsibility to ensure transparency and accountability, and to prevent any violations of the sanction's regime, in particular the arms embargo or misuse of Libyan frozen assets;

xi. Calling on the appropriate department of the AU commission to examine the possible revitalization of the Tripartite Task Force on Migration (AU-UN-EU);

xii. Expediting the procedures of the relocation of the African Union Liaison Office for Libya to Tripoli; and

xiii. Urging all parties who have not yet signed the AU-facilitated Charter Peace and Reconciliation in Libya (signed on 14 February, 2025 in Addis Ababa), to do so without delay, in order to accelerate Libya's ongoing political process.