AUCTC

African Union Counter Terrorism Centre

THE QUARTERLY AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN (QATB)

SECOND QUARTER | APRIL-JUNE 2024 | EDITION 008

ABOUT AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN

In line with its mandate to assist African Union (AU) Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to build their Counter-Terrorism capacities and to Prevent Violent Extremism, the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) has developed tools that enable it to collect, analyse, process, and disseminate information on terrorism-related incidents occurring in Africa. One of the products of this effort is the quarterly Africa Terrorism Bulletin (ATB) that is published by the Centre.

The objective of the Africa Terrorism Bulletin is to provide a quarterly assessment of terrorism and violent extremism situation and trends on the continent. This is aimed at providing African Union Member States up to date information on terrorism incidents and its related activities. The Q-ATB also seeks to keep AU Member State Policymakers, Researchers, Practitioners and other stakeholders in the fields of Counter-Terrorism (CT) and the Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), updated quarterly, on the trends of terrorism on the Continent.

Notwithstanding the lack of a universally accepted common definition of **Terrorism**, the AU, in its **1999 OAU CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM**, ***Article 1paragraph 3, (a) and (b), and Article 3***, defines what constitutes a ***Terrorist Act***. The AUCTC and therefore the QATB defer to this definition.

This edition of the bulletin, covering terrorism incidents from April to June 2024 is part of the efforts of providing relevant policy stakeholders the threat situation in order to facilitate evidence-based and data driven decision making processes that may culminate into the defeat of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

General Situation. 1st April to 30th April 2024 recorded 1,003 terrorist attacks that resulted in 4,818 deaths across Africa. On monthly basis, April recorded 334 attacks that resulted in 1,408 deaths, May recorded 327 attacks that led to 1,527 while June recorded 342 attacks and 1,883 deaths. Attacks and deaths in Q2 2024 increased by 07% and 50% when compared to Q1 2024. Although increase in attacks was marginal, the corresponding increase in deaths was significant, signaling the brutality and complexity of attacks. Of the 4,818 deaths recorded, 2,757 were civilians, 1,037 were military/security personnel and 1,030 were terrorists.

Terrorist Attacks in Regions. West Africa recorded 45% of the total attacks and 62% of total deaths, Central Africa recorded 30% of attacks and 23% of deaths, East Africa recorded 19% attacks and 11% of deaths, Southern Africa was 6% of attacks and 4% of deaths while North Africa recorded only one attack of attacks and no death.

Countries Most Affected. The five most affected countries by terrorist attacks during the period were: Burkina Faso, DRC, Somalia, Mali, and Cameroon (*in decreasing order*).

Focus on Epicentres. The Sahel region accounted for 37% of attacks and 56% of deaths, the Horn of Africa region recorded 17% of attacks with 12% of deaths, and the Great Lakes Region recorded 17% of attacks with 20% deaths, Lake Chad Basin recorded for 6% of attacks and 7% deaths.

Primary Targets of Attacks. From a total of 1,003 attacks across the continent, 581 were against Civilian targets, 377 targeted Military/Security Forces, 34 targeted International Organizations and 11 targeted Governmental Institutions/Officials. ADF/ISCAP, ASWJ, Boko Haram, ISGS, ISWAP, and JNIM concentrated their attacks against civilian targets, whilst Al-Shabaab heavily targeted the military/security forces.

Weapons Used. The terrorist groups used Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in 72% of the total attacks, IEDs were used in 21% of attacks, mixed attacks (IED & SALW) constituted 2% and 5% were cases of kidnapping.

Casualties Inflicted by Terrorist Groups. JNIM was responsible for 1,793 deaths (1,208 Civilians, 585 Military/Security personnel); **ADF/ISCAP** for 516 deaths (507 Civilians, 09 Military/Security personnel); **Al-Shabaab** for 368 deaths (92 Civilians, 276 Military/Security personnel); **ISGS** killed 248 people (205 Civilians, 43 Military/Security personnel); **ISWAP** killed 164 people (125 Civilians, 39 Military/Security personnel). **Boko Haram** was responsible for 141 deaths (128 Civilians, 13 Military/Security Forces) and **ASWJ** for 88 deaths (53 Civilians, 35 Military/Security personnel) and **Unidentified groups** killed 476 people (439 Civilians, 37 Military/Security personnel).

Kidnapping. 53 cases of kidnappings were recorded. A total of 406 persons were taken hostage in Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cameroon, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Somalia while 418 captives were released during the same period.

Counter-Terrorism Response. CT Operations neutralized 2,675 terrorists.

Casualties Sustained by Terrorist Groups. JNIM suffered the highest number of casualties with 982; **Al-Shabaab** with 679; 445 for **ISWAP**; 209 for **ISGS**, **Boko Haram** with 146; **ASWJ** with 92 and **ADF/ISCAP** lost 33 members. **Unidentified groups** suffered 78 deaths.

High Profile Attacks.

- On 05 April, **JNIM** militants clashed with the Coordination for Safeguarding Democracy (CSP) defense group in Nampala, Segou, Mali. A total of 23 CSP fighters and 19 JNIM militants were killed.
- On 20 May, **JNIM** clashed with Niger security forces in the village of Boni, Tillaberi, Niger. At least seven soldiers were killed, and 41 militants were also neutralised in reprisal attack.
- On 29 May, **ASWJ** IS linked ASWJ militants clashed with Mozambican and Rwandan forces in Limala, Mocimboa da Praia district, Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. Rwanda forces claimed killing 70 militants and IS also claimed killing 14 soldiers.
- On 08 June, **Al-Shabaab** carried out a suicide vehicle borne IED (SVBIED) attack in Ceel Dheer, Galgaduud, Somalia targeting government security forces and Abgal Clan militia. Al-shabaab claimed killing 59 soldiers and Somali Government also claimed killing 60 militants.
- On 11 June, **JNIM** militants attacked soldiers at a military base in the town of Mansila, Yagha, Burkina Faso. Over 120 soldiers and 60 civilians were killed. Militants seized quantity of weapons and ammunitions.

Conclusion/Recommendations. The challenge of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa is one of Human Security and National Stability rather than Traditional National Security. The responses over the years have, however, securitized CT approaches on the continent. Although military strategies may be justifiable in combative situations, evidence has shown that they are not enough, and that more practical and lasting solutions must be targeted at preventative measures. Obviously, guns and bullets which kill terrorists cannot win the hearts and minds of the local population to build the much-needed trust and confidence which are necessary to dissuade local communities from aligning with terrorist or violent extremist groups. However, local development, decentralization, devolution and local governance anchored on human security, protection and empowerment have the propensity to deny terrorist groups their footholds and could culminate into achieving the much-desired enduring peace, security, stability, national cohesion and sustainable development.

REPORT METHODOLOGY

Data Source: The AUCTC follows a strict Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for data collection, processing, analysis, and reporting. This is aimed at ensuring the data used for this report meets international data processing requirements and is devoid of data biases. The data collected for this report is, therefore, limited to open-source information, field missions' reports, as well as data received from AUCTC Focal Point Community from all 55 Member States of the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and Regional Mechanisms (RMs). The data are collected, categorized, and stored in the AUCTC Database in conformity with the definition of terrorist acts as defined by the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.

Database: The AUCTC maintains a robust database that stores information on terrorism, more specifically, on terrorist groups, their leaders and members, and activities and avails this information to the African Union Commission, the African Union Member States, Regional Economic Communities, and relevant Regional Mechanisms. In the framework of its Continental Counter-Terrorism Early Warning System (AUCTC CT-CEWS), information for the Database is collected by the AUCTC Situation-Room using the Africa Media Monitor (AMM) developed in collaboration with the African Union Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) Situation-Room in the AU Commission and the European Union Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) for advanced web mining and information extraction. With the AMM, the ACSRT Situation Room scans and accesses over 1400 websites 24/7 and retrieves real time open-source information on terrorist incidents. The Centre also stores terrorism-related information received from Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and relevant Regional Mechanisms (RMs) based on existing cooperation agreements. The AU Continental Early Warning Situation-Room and reports from AU Field Missions and other field missions are also sources of information for the bulletin.

Validation: Data quality management is carried out based on internationally accepted data quality metrics to ensure data integrity is not comprised. Information validity and reliability, and source reliability and credibility based on internal SOP for information gathering are adhered to. To ensure validity, credibility and reliability, the Centre validates all accessed terrorism incidents from the AUCTC National and Regional Focal Points. The Focal Points are the institutions in AU Members and RECs/RMs designated to collaborate and share terrorism and Counter-Terrorism related information with the AUCTC. In accordance with its mandate, the information validated by the AUCTC on the number of attacks, deaths and injuries recorded are considered as the official data for the AUCTC Database irrespective of other conflicting figures.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1.The threats of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa have continued unabated, disrupting normal lives in local communities and contributing to the vulnerabilities of people across the continent. Over the years, the African Union (AU) and its technical agencies as well as member states have undertaken several initiatives and measures aimed at reversing the escalating threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism. In spite of the efforts being deployed by the AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs), Member States (MS), and other stakeholders in combating terrorism and preventing violent extremism, the scourges continue to pose significant threats to peace, security, national stability, and development in many parts of Africa. The implication is that the terrorism situation is becoming increasingly uncontrollable.

2. In recent times, several existing and emerging factors have been noted to have worsen the situation. While political instability, the associated sanctions and their unintended consequences occasioned by the unconstitutional changes of government (UCG) - have in part contributed to the recent resurgence of terrorism; emerging factors such as the growing use of community auto defense groups, Mercenaries and PMCs which are illegal by the 1977 OAU Convention on Mercenaries, the entrenched nexus between transnational organised crime network groups (TOC) and terrorism, the growing use of emerging technologies including Military grade drones, and Climate Change vulnerabilities appear to be sustaining the momentum of terrorism and violent extremism. These factors have contributed to the spreading of the threats into new geographical areas, which were previously not affected. The threats in the coastal states have heightened, and no state along the Atlantic corridor is immune. Terrorist groups are now executing a grand strategy of geographic expansion with the aim of occupying territories, and to undermine the legitimacy of states.

3. In the second of quarter (April -June) of 2024, the Violent Extremism and Terrorism threats have remained potent, with further escalation in terms of attacks and associated fatalities. The implication of the ongoing threats situation is that much more efforts are needed to reverse the growing trend. So far, for the first half of 2024, almost 2,000 attacks have already taken place across the continent, killing more than 8,000 people, majority of them are civilians in local communities as well as security and law enforcement officers. In addition to the number of fatalities, almost 3,000 people have been injured as a results of terrorist attacks, with properties and military equipment and installations worth millions of dollars destroyed. While sustaining the ongoing counter terrorism operations and initiatives are paramount, there is the need to reassess the response generation efforts to determine their effectiveness within the changing dynamics of terrorists' movements and tactics.

4. This year, the epicentre of the terrorism and violent extremism situation have remained the Horn of Africa, the Lake Chad Basin, the Central Sahel region, and the Great Lakes region. While there are not many changes in the situations in Horn of Africa and Lake Chad Basin when compared to last year (2023), the situations in the Central Sahel region and the Great Lakes region have seen massive changes. Terrorist and violent extremist groups operating in the Central Sahel and the Great Lakes region have escalated their violence and have resulted in higher fatality rates. In the Central Sahel, the complexity and brutality of attacks have increased. Greater efforts are required to halt the growing and expansionary threats of terrorism and violent extremism.

5. The challenge of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa is one of Human Security and National Stability rather than Traditional National Security. The responses over the years have, however, securitized CT Approaches on the continent. Although military strategies may be justifiable in combative situations, evidence has shown that they are not enough and, in most cases, they have worsened the situation and that more practical and lasting solutions must be targeted at preventative measures. No Country currently in the eye of the storm of terrorism and violent extremism can "bullet" itself out of the threat. Obviously, guns and bullets which kill terrorists cannot win the hearts and minds of the local population to build the much-needed trust and confidence which are necessary to dissuade local communities from aligning with terrorist or violent extremist groups. However, local development, decentralization, devolution and local governance anchored on human security, protection and empowerment which kill terrorism have the propensity to deny terrorist groups their footholds and could culminate into achieving the much-desired enduring peace, security, stability, national cohesion and sustainable development in West Africa and the Sahel.

CONTINENTAL TERRORISM INCIDENTS MAPS



Terrorism Attacks from 1st April to 30th June 2024: Source: AUCTC Database, 2024



Terrorism Deaths from 1st April to 30th June 2024: Source: AUCTC Database, 2024

NUMERICAL DATA: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

1. Total Number of Terrorist Attacks and Deaths

A total of **1,003** terrorism incidents including 53 cases of kidnapping were recorded from 1st April to 30th June 2024. The attacks resulted in **4,818** deaths across the continent. Also, 1,174 people were injured during the attacks. The data shows a fluctuation in the number of increases and decreases in attacks, but the number of deaths witnessed a consistent increase from April to June 2024 **(see Fig 1)**. The total attacks and deaths recorded for Q2 2024 increased by 07% and 50% respectively, when compared to quarter one of this year (Q4 2024). The general observation is that terrorism and violent extremism situation across the continent is much worse in second quarter of 2024 than they were in first quarter (Q1 2024). While the increase in the number of attacks was marginal, the corresponding increase in the fatalities was significant, demonstrating the complexity and brutality of terrorist attacks for the period under review.



2. Primary Targets of Attacks



The trend in primary targets changed for the period, as civilians bore the brunt of terrorist attacks. This is contrary to previous quarter where an equal number of attacks targeted both civilian and security forces.

The changes could be explained by the escalation of attacks by armed groups in the eastern DRC, particularly M23 attacks on local communities. JNIM and ISGS attacks in the Sahel region also contributed significantly to the increased attacks on civilians.

3. Deaths per Category



Consistent with the primary targets, Civilians casualty was the highest for the period (**2,757).** A significant number of Military/Security Forces **(1,037)** were killed by terrorist groups, while **1,030** Terrorists were also eliminated during attacks perpetrated by the groups (**see fig 3**).

4. Type of Attack



As shown in **fig 4**, Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) were used for **719** out of the **1,003** attacks for the period**.** This resulted in the death of **4,137** representing **72%** of all deaths for the period **(See fig 5).**

The use of IEDs have become widespread. **212** attacks involved the use of IED resulting in the **459** deaths (**21%**).

5. Deaths by Type of Attack



In **19** attacks, a combination of IEDs and SALWs were used, and **211** people killed and **53** cases of kidnappings were recorded, and **11** people kidnapped were killed (**see fig 5**). Deaths resulting from mixed use of IEDs and SALWs and Kidnapping accounted for **7%** of the total deaths for the period.

6. Total Number of Attacks and Deaths



7. Terrorism Related Deaths by Region



8. Regional Deaths by Categories



Note: North Africa recorded no death for the Period.

9. Type of Attacks by Terrorist Groups

Table 1: Types of Attacks by Terrorist Groups

Terrorist Group	SALW	IED	Mixed	Kidnapping	Comments
JNIM	224	71	04	17	Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) constituted the major means of attack by JNIM for the period under review. 224 out of the 316 attacks were done using SALWs. There was also high number of attacks involving the use of IEDs, as 71 attacks used IED, 4 mixed (IEDs and SALWs), and 17 cases of kidnappings were associated with the group
Al-Shabaab	86	94	12	-	Al-Shabaab attacks were predominately carried out using IEDs. 94 out of the 192 attacks were IED. Significant number of SALWs were also used, 86 cases were recorded, and 12 mixed (IED and SALW).
ISWAP	79	13	-	12	ISWAP carried out 79 attacks using SALW. The use of IED (13) by ISWAP decreased, and 12 cases of kidnappings.
ADF/ISCAP	82	-	-	02	ADF/ISCAP attacks are predominately carried out using SALWs. 82 out of the 84 attacks were SALW, and 02 case of kidnapping were associated.
Boko Haram	56	02	01	15	Boko Haram carried out 56 attacks using SALW, 02 attacks using IED, 01 cased of mixed, and 15 cases of kidnappings.
ISGS	53	03	01	05	Most of the attacks by ISGS involved the use of SAWL. 53 attacks used SALW, 03 case involving IED, 01 case of mixed, and 05 cases of Kidnapping was associated to the group.
ASWJ	47	-	-	-	ASWJ attacks for the period were predominantly carried out using SALWs. All the 47 attacks were carried out by the group using SALW.
Other IS Affiliates +	-	01	-	-	One attack carried out by Other IS Affiliates involve the use of IEDs
Unidentified Groups*	92	28	01	02	Unidentified groups used SALWs in the majority of attacks. In 92 out of 123 attacks by these groups, SALWs were used. They used IEDs in 28 attacks. They were also responsible for 01 case of mixed, and 02 cases of kidnappings.
TOTAL	**719**	**212**	**19**	**53**	

+ Other Islamic State (IS) Affiliates are all splinter IS affiliated groups mainly operating in the North Africa Region including Sinai Peninsula (IS-SP-Egypt), Somalia (ISS) and Southern Libya.
** Unidentified Groups are all terrorist attacks carried out by the various known terrorist groups operating in Africa, but either did not claim responsibility for the attacks, or security forces did not attribute the attack to any group. Even though, the attacks might have taken place in an operational theatre of a known terrorist group, without claiming of responsibility by the group or attribution by Security Forces or ACSRT Analysts, it is left as Unidentified Groups. In addition, Violent Extremists groups such as Separatists in the Anglophone Region of Cameroon, Banditry activities in Northwestern Nigeria, whose attacks have been conveniently classified as terrorist act by the Member States concerned are captured under Unidentified Groups.*

10. Terrorist Groups and their Primary Targets

Table 2: Details of Terrorist groups and their Primary Targets

Terrorist Groups	Civilians	Military/ Security	Gov't Inst./Of.	Int. Org.	Total Attacks Carried	Total Deaths Caused
JNIM	198	117	01	-	316	1,794
Al-Shabaab	32	141	07	12	192	382
ISWAP	67	31	02	04	104	168
ADF/ISCAP	75	06	-	03	84	516
Boko Haram	59	14	-	01	74	141
ISGS	43	19	-	-	62	248
ASWJ	34	12	-	07	53	88
Other IS Affiliates	01	-	-	-	01	-
Unidentified groups	72	37	01	07	123	476
TOTAL	**581**	**377**	**11**	**34**	**1,003**	**3,809**

11. Death Categories Caused by Terrorist Groups



12. Members of Terrorist Groups Killed (In Attacks and CT Operations)



13. Country Terrorism Situation

Table 3: Details Record of Countries – April to June 2024

Country	Total Attacks	Total Deaths (Attacks)	Total Injured	Civilian Casualties	Military/Security Casualties	Terrorists Killed in Attacks	Deaths (CT)
Benin	14	28	0	10	9	9	0
Burkina Faso	213	1790	252	1,123	486	181	421
Burundi	2	7	43	7	0	0	0
Cameroon	114	124	37	103	12	9	20
Central African Republic (CAR)	22	97	41	84	6	7	4
Chad	1	3	0	3	0	0	71
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	163	895	220	826	38	31	56
Kenya	19	43	6	20	23	0	0
Libya	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mali	114	527	106	189	67	268	132
Mozambique	53	180	40	53	35	92	0
Niger	62	311	34	115	79	117	48
Nigeria	45	301	104	144	20	137	342
Somalia	173	497	277	72	253	172	536
Togo	7	15	14	8	3	4	0
	1,003	**4,818**	**1,174**	**2,757**	**1,037**	**1,030**	**1,630**

14. The Five Most Affected Countries



Approximately **78%** of all attacks for the period took place in the five countries most affected.

Out of a total of **1,003** attacks recorded across the continent, **777** of the attacks occurred in Burkina Faso, DRC, Somalia, Mali, and Cameroon.

Similarly, about **80%** of all deaths recorded for the period, resulting from direct terrorist attacks occurred in the above mentioned five countries. **3,833** out of the total deaths of **4,818** happened in the five most affected countries.

The highest rate of lethality for the period was in **Burkina Faso**, where estimated 8 people were killed in each successful attack.

15. Terrorist Attacks- Most Fatal Incidents

Table 4: List of high-Profile Attacks

No.	Country	Place	Date	Group	Deaths	Description
1	Burkina Faso	Yagha	11 June	JNIM	180	JNIM attacked soldiers in a military camp located in the town of Mansila. At least 120 soldiers and 60 civilians were killed in the attack. About 10 soldiers were also captured. The militants also seized an important quantity of weapons and equipment
2	Somalia	Galgaduud	08 June	Al-Shabaab	119	Al Shabaab launched an attack against government security forces and Abgal clan militia bases in Ceel Dheer town. The militants detonated a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED), followed by heavy exchange of gunfire. Al Shabaab claimed killing 59 soldiers and injured 17 others. Government also claimed killing at least 60 militants
3	Mozambique	Cabo Delgado	29 May	ASWJ	84	IS linked ASWJ militants clashed with Mozambican and Rwandan forces in Limala. Rwandan forces claimed killing at least 70 ASWJ militants. Islamic State also claimed killing 14 Rwandan soldiers and injured 10 others.
4	Burkina Faso	Yatenga	22 May	JNIM	80	At least eight VDPs and 72 civilians were killed when JNIM militants attacked VDPs in three IDP camps in the towns of Goubre, Sima and Kossouka. 21 civilians were also injured including women and children
5	Burkina Faso	Tapoa	30 June	JNIM	78	Suspected JNIM militants attacked a military base and VDP positions in the town of Partiaga. At least 12 soldiers, 16 VDPs and 50 civilians were killed during the attack.
6	Burkina Faso	Tapoa	05 May	JNIM	52	JNIM militants attacked positions of gendarmes and VDP in Barrage village. At least two gendarmes and 34 civilians were killed. Four gendarmes, two VDP and 15 civilians were injured. Security forces repulsed the attack and killed 16 JNIM militants.
7	Niger	Tillaberi	20 May	JNIM	48	At least seven soldiers were killed, two soldiers and a civilian were injured when JNIM militants clashed with the Niger military. About 41 militants were also killed, and their vehicles destroyed, according to a government statement
8	DRC	North Kivu	07 June	ISCAP (ADF)	42	Suspected ISCAP/ADF armed men attacked the village of Masala located within Beni region. At least 42 civilians were killed, and three motorbikes were burned.
9	DRC	North Kivu	12 June	ISCAP (ADF)	42	Suspected ISCAP/ADF militants attacked the village of Baswaga located within the Lubero enclave. At least 42 civilians were killed, and at least 10 others were taken hostage.
10	Mali	Segou	05 April	JNIM	42	JNIM militants clashed with the Coordination for Safeguarding Democracy (CSP) defense group. At least 23 CSP fighters and 19 JNIM militants were killed. 15 CSP fighters were also wounded, five CSP vehicles destroyed, and 12 CSP fighters were captured

16. Attacks in Epicentres

Figure 12: Percentage of Attacks in Epicentres



A total of **774** representing **77%** of total attacks were recorded in areas considered epicentre of terrorists and violent extremists' activities in Africa. These areas are the Lake Chad Basin, The Horn of Africa, The Central Sahel, and the Great Lakes Region.

The Central Sahel of Africa recorded **372** attacks**,** followed by the Horn of Africa which recorded **173** attacks, the Great Lakes Region recorded **165** attacks, while the Lake Chad Basin witnessed **64** attacks**.**

17. Deaths Recorded in Epicenters

Figure 13: Deaths in Epicentres



A total of **4,377** representing **91%** of total deaths were recorded in areas considered as epicentre of terrorism.

The Central Sahel region recorded **2,587** deaths**,** followed by the Great Lakes Region which recorded **902** deaths, the Horn of Africa Region recorded **540** deaths, while the Lake Chad Basin witnessed **348** deaths.

Almost 70% of all the deaths recorded in the Central Sahel Region emanated from Burkina Faso. Meanwhile Somalia remains the major contributor of deaths in the Horn of Africa. Similarly, majority of deaths in Great Lakes were recorded in DRC.

EVALUATION DATA TREND: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

1. The period under review, **01 April** to **30 June 2024** recorded a significant increase in the number of terrorist attacks and associated fatalities when compared to the preceding period of January to March 2024. While attacks increased by 07%, deaths on the other hand increased by 50% when compared to Q1 2024. The rate of lethality increased, reaching 5 deaths per each successful attack, compared to 3 deaths per each attack recorded in the previous reporting period. The overall implication is that terrorist groups carried out several complex and sophisticated attacks against their targets. The period recorded 1,003 terrorist attacks that resulted in 4,818 deaths whilst the previous reporting period registered 934 attacks and 3,220 deaths. The number of attacks and deaths recorded show that terrorist groups exhibited great freedom of movement along their mobility corridors.

2. There was a significant increase in the number of attacks in Central Africa and Southern Africa, while attacks went up slightly in West Africa and East Africa. However, attacks in North Africa declined. In terms of the number of deaths, West Africa, Southern Africa, and Central Africa regions recorded astronomical increase in the number of deaths, whereas as East Africa recorded a sharp decline in deaths. Deaths resulting from attacks in West Africa increased by almost 70%, that of Central Africa increased by 95%, Southern Africa increased by almost 70%. However, deaths in East Africa declined by almost 40%. No death was recorded in North Africa for the reported period. The overall implication is that the complexity and sophisticated nature of fatalities associated with terrorist attacks increased across Africa. This could mean that the groups had freedom of movement along their mobility corridors or short falls in counter terrorism intelligence capabilities allowed the group the leeway to plan and execute sophisticated attacks.

3. Sahel Belt of West Africa. The Sahel region was the most affected epicentre during the period under review. Al-Qaeda's affiliate - **Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)** intensified its operations against security forces in Burkina Faso and Mali. Another violent actor and Islamic State Affiliated group- **Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)** also carried out several attacks, particularly in Niger. About 33% of all attacks and 47% of all deaths that took place across the continent occurred in the central Sahel area of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. This was higher than those recorded during the first quarter (Q1 2024).

4. **Burkina Faso** remains key to the stabilisation of coastal West Africa. The terrorism and violent extremism situation in the country remain a growing concern. The data shows attacks and associated fatalities increased exponentially within the period under review. The forces of confrontation were between the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) and JNIM on one hand and JNIM and Burkinabe security forces on another hand. Several VDP security posts were attacked by JNIM leading to several casualties within the ranks of the VDP. Burkina Faso requires a lot of support- technical and logistic to completely degrade the capacity of terrorist groups. This is because, if efforts are not put in place to stop further entrenchment of terrorist groups, the country could become the launchpad for the destabilisation of the entire coast of West Africa.

5. **Mali** is at the crossroad of several security complexities**.** While JNIM and ISGS are engaged in activities of Violent Extremism and Terrorism, Tuareg and Arab armed groups operating under the banner of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) coalition whose main objective is to seek independent Azawad continue to generate insecurity. Reconciliation, dialogue and mediation could play a key role in achieving lasting peace and security in Mali. While the ongoing kinetic operations are essential, it appears it could be near impossible to stabilise the country if a whole of society approach is not adopted to reverse the current trend. The underlying root causes of the insecurity must be tackled. The causes are multi-faced and required a concerted approach whose ownership must be defined, owned and accepted by all actors on the conflict scene.

6. **Niger's** security situation is comparatively stable. However, in the Diffa region, Boko Haram and ISWAP carried out several attacks in many local communities. In the Sahel area particularly within the Liptako-Gourma enclave, ISGS and JNIM also attacked several communities. Nonetheless, there was a general improvement in the situation due to deliberate counter terrorism measures. The MNJTF activities in the Lake Chad Basin contributed significantly to the stabilisation of the Diffa region, whereas the joint operations with Mali and Burkina Faso reduced JNIM and ISGS attacks. That notwithstanding, terrorist groups continue to exhibit great capability and freedom of movement in various parts of Niger, in particular Agadez, Tillaberi and Diffa.

7. <u>Lake Chad Basin</u>. Terrorism situation in the Lak Chad Basin has seen consistent decline since 2022. Although the **Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP**) and **Boko Haram** continue to carry out attacks within areas they still have control, the effects of those attacks have been minimal. Within the period, several planned attacks by ISWAP and Boko Haram within the LCB area were successfully repulsed by security forces, causing several casualties to militants' groups. The continuous decline and limited casualties of terrorist attacks could be attributed to the counter terrorism activities of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the lake Chad Basin (MNJTF) which has played a key role in degrading the capacity of terrorist groups and limiting their freedom of movement. However, despite the operational successes of the deployed forces, terrorism and violent extremism in the LCB are far from over.

8. Cameroon remains the most affected country in the LCB by the violent activities of **Boko Haram** and **ISWAP**. Civilians in local communities continue to bear the brunt of terrorist activities, thereby inhibiting their movements within their living areas. In the period under review, areas such as *Mayo-Sava*, *Mayo-Tsanaga, Logone-et-Chari*, and *Mayo-Moskota* all located within the Far North Region were the most affected areas within the period. While violent extremism situation by the Anglophone *Ambazonia* Separatist Groups in North-West and South-West Regions have considerably declined within the Q2 2024, a lot of commitments are required in the Far North area. Given the work that have already been done by the various sectors of the MNJTF, enhancing intelligence cooperation and building trust between community members and security forces could help security forces disrupt, detect and intercept terrorists planned activities before they take place.

9. Chad has remained consistently stable since the last two years. Terrorism and violent extremism activities within the LCB area of Chad have remained low. For the people under review, only one incident was recorded. On 09 April, Kinassaroum Ouest, Lac Province, ISWAP militants attacked the community. At least three fishers were killed during the attack. However, two months after this isolated incident, the Chadian army, supported by the MNJTF, launched ground, naval and air strikes at ISWAP positions on 30 June 2024. More than 70 terrorists were killed, and five camps were destroyed. It is, however, crucial to prevent other ethnic tensions and conflicts that could be leveraged by terrorist groups to rekindle their activities.

10. Nigeria further recorded a decline in the number of attacks, when compared to the previous period (Q1 2024). The attacks in the Q2 2024 declined by about 40%. The areas that witnessed terrorism activities were Niger State (attacked by suspected Boko Haram Militants), Taraba State (attacked by suspected ISWAP militants) and Borno State. Except the few isolated incidents in Niger and Taraba states, almost all the attacks took place in Norther Eastern Borno state. Despite the general decline in terrorist attacks countrywide, Borno appears to be experiencing resurgence of terrorism and violent extremism activities by Boko Haram and ISWAP. This is a worrying situation. Counter terrorism deployed forces may want to examine the shortfalls that appears to be favouring terrorist groups freedom of movement within Borno for the period under review. There is a need to reverse this trend.

11. <u>Coastal States of West Africa</u>. West Africa Coastal States continue to experience militants' encroachment threatening their national security and stability. Given the current situation of terrorism and violent extremism in Central Sahel, no country in the coastal states is currently immune to the threat. Recent violent incidents in the Central Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have contributed to the heightening insecurity among coastal states. **Benin, Cote d'Ivoire**, **Ghana**, **Guinea**, **Senegal**, and **Togo** are currently experiencing high level of terrorism and violent extremism risks due to the rapid westward and southward expansion of terrorist activities in the Sahel. Even though, Benin and Togo are currently in the eye of the storm of terrorism, recent incidents have threatened the national stability, safety and security of other coastal states.

12. Benin has been the hardest hit of the coastal countries by terrorism and violent extremism**.** For the second quarter (Q2 2024), the number of attacks declined by over 30%. JNIM remains the most active terror group within the jurisdiction of Benin. For the period under review attacks were concentrated in communities located within *Atakora* and *Alibori* departments. These attacks are often targeted at farmers, pastoralists and security forces. While the government has exercised several initiatives to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism, additional efforts are required to build rapport between security forces and local communities.

13. Togo continues to witness worrying incidences of terrorism and violent extremism at the Northern Savanes region. Violence has gradually seeped into Togo since 2021, when terrorists attacked Sanloaga near the borders with Benin and Burkina Faso. Violent extremist organizations from northern Benin and Burkina Faso are increasingly targeting northern Togo. A number of incidents took place during the reported period, resulting in a number of casualties among the security and civilian populations. On 02 April, Lalabiga, Savanes, a Togolese military vehicle was hit by a home-made explosive device planted by suspected JNIM in the region. At least eight soldiers and civilians were wounded. Also on 26 April, Kpenkankandi, Savanes, JNIM claimed responsibility for an attack that killed five people. In the month of June, about 10 people were killed from attacks that took place in Savanes region.

14. East and Horn of Africa. The Second Quarter of 2024 witnessed a decline of terrorism and violent extremism attacks in the East and Horn of Africa. Terrorist attacks in the region declined by more than 35% and associated fatalities also declined by 27%. Consistently, since the beginning of 2024, fatalities associated with terrorist attacks keep declining. This means that terrorist group do not have the freedom to carry out complex and sophisticated attacks within the Horn of Africa. Even though attacks and fatalities reduced, the number of terrorist incidents within the period remained significantly high. Deliberate counter terrorism measures by the deployed forces within the region have contributed significantly to the reduction of attacks and fatalities within the region.

15. Burundi continues to experience violent extremism incidents in the form of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This trend of attack has continued since the beginning of the year in January. While the Red Tabara is suspected to be the group behind these attacks, other unidentified groups have on several occasions perpetrated such attacks on innocent civilians in public spaces. For instance, on 10 May, *Mukaza, Bujumbura*, an unidentified armed group exploded two grenades at a bus park in central Bujumbura, Rohero. Four people were killed and about 38 were seriously injured. Armed group RED-Tabara is suspected to have carried out the violence attack. Similarly, on 05 May, *Ntahangwa, Bujumbura*, an unidentified armed group exploded a grenade at a bar on the 6th avenue of Gikizi neighborhood located in the zone of Kamenge. Three people were killed, and five others were seriously injured. These incidents mean that access to component of IEDs must be properly regulated.

16. Kenya recorded a marginal increase in the number of attacks and fatalities for the period. Areas that were attacked include Lamu, Garissa, and Mandera. Almost all the attacks that occurred in the country within the period were conducted by Al-Shabaab. Given the Al-Shabaab's modus operandi, IEDs constituted the major means by which the group attacked its targets within Kenya. Indeed, Al-shabaab remains the sole non state actor responsible for the insecurity in Northern Kenya, particularly along the Kenya-Somalia border. For instance, on 29 April, El Wak, Mandera. Suspected Al Shabaab engaged in an armed clash with police officers in El Wak town. The clash began with an explosion concealed within a donkey cart. At least 13 people were killed comprising 2 police officers and 11 civilians. Five others were injured.

17. Somalia's security situation significantly improved for the second quarter (Q2 2024). Both attacks and fatalities declined by more than 30% when the situation is compared with Q1 2024. The significant decline is attributed to the enhanced counter terrorism operations by various deployed forces including the work of African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) as well as the frequent ground and airstrikes by the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). It must also be recognised that different forces of the Somalia National Army and other security intelligence, coupled with the involvement of community auto defence group have resulted in the decline**.** IEDs manufacturing technologies continue to remain key in Al-Shabaab's operations, as the group continue to launch several complicated IEDs attacks against security forces in their military camps. The overall implication is that, despite the significant counter terrorism operations, Al-Shabaab remained entrenched and deeply rooted within the Somali society. A lot of efforts are therefore required to fully degrade its capability within the near future. Within the period, ATMIS moved further on the withdrawal of forces. While the withdrawal is a mandated arrangement, there is the fear of security lapses that could spark resurgence of terrorism.

20. Central Africa and the Great Lakes region. Terrorism and violent extremism situation in the Great Lakes Region remain a challenging situation. The region recorded significant increase in the number of attacks perpetrated by terrorist and violent extremists' groups. The level of atrocities by the multitude of terrorist groups, non-state armed groups, and other violent extremist groups escalated. Attacks saw a sharp increase of about 60%, whereas the fatalities from attacks were increased by also 80%. The different security situations perpetrated by violent actors continue to hamper peace and security initiatives within the Great Lakes Region.

21. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) consistently for the second time in the year experienced a spike in violence. While many parts of Eastern DRC are engulfed by protracted conflicts and acts of insecurity, provinces such *Ituri*, *North Kivu*, and *South Kivu* have remained the hotspot for terrorism and violent extremism. The insecurity in eastern DRC continued to fuel a long-standing humanitarian crisis often ignored by the international community. For the period under review, the main armed groups causing the devastating atrocities include the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)/Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), Congo Development Cooperative (CODECO), and the Movement of 23 March (M23). Despite repeated ceasefire arrangements, heavy fighting between the Congolese army and M23 armed group has intensified further causing a worsening humanitarian and security in local communities. Despite the deployment of Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC), the various armed groups have remained resolute in their attacks and atrocities. As a results, the recorded violent incidents increased by over 60% whereas the associated fatalities more than doubled. This was due to increased violent activities by M23 and other terrorist groups such as ADF/ISCAP. Given the ongoing situation, if adequate and permanent solutions are not put in place, the insecurity could be far more than already experienced.

22. Central African Republic (CAR) remains a concern. Several civil in local communities were attacked by violent extremist groups. The main perpetrators of violence were Armed groups-Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) which launched several IED attacks against Armed Forces of CAR (FACA). Even though there were no significant changes in the number of attacks, the current level of insecurity is a worry.

23. North Africa and the Maghreb. Consistent with the previous reporting period, North Africa and the Maghreb region remained relatively peaceful and stable. No major terrorism and violent extremism incidents were recorded within the period. Persistent intelligence led counter terrorism operations in **Algeria** resulted in the dismantling of terrorist cells affiliated to the former Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). For instance, on 23 May, *Oued Fodda, Chlef*, Algerian army soldiers conducted a military operation against AQIM in Djebel Tamoulga and killed 2 AQIM militants. They seized two AK-47 rifles and three magazines. Similarly, on 24 June, *Meshtat Al-Gara, Ain Defla region*, Algerian security forces in a counter insurgency operation killed a presumed AQIM militant during a clearing operation in Meshtat Al-Gara/Al Yaraa, in Ain Defla region. They seized one AK-47 rifle, one a magazine and binoculars. In **Libya,** even though only one incident involving IED occurred, there is a cause for concern of the general security situation, which if not addressed could serve as a fertile ground of terrorist group to resurge their activities.

26. Southern Africa. The Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) or known locally as Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamaah (ASWJ) has been the sole driver of terrorism and violent extremism in Southern Africa region. The group has transformed itself into a deadly violent group with the aim of destabilising the entire Southern Africa Region. While the group has established its base in Northern Provinces of Cabo Delgado with occasional attacks in Nampula, it continues to enjoy recruitment from neighbouring countries within the broader Southern Africa region. Despite the counter terrorism operations by the SAMIM forces, Tanzania and Rwanda forces alongside their counterparts from Mozambique, the group remain resilient. During the under review, violent activities by ASWJ increased when compared to the previous reported period (Q1 2024). A total of 53 attacks were recorded, resulting in the deaths of 180 people. This represents 37% increase in attacks, and over 70% increase in the number of deaths. While the terrorism incident has been increasing since January 2024, SAMIM has ended its mission and already begun withdrawal of forces. Critical to completely degrading the capabilities of ASWJ will be maintaining the counter terrorism momentum in order to sustain the gains made by SAMIM forces. This requires international assistance and support to the Government of Mozambique. Southern Africa countries should also see the stabilisation of Northern Mozambique as a sine quo non for the stabilisation of the entire region. Given the recruitment activities of ASWJ in other southern Africa countries, if Northern Mozambique is not secured, it could spell doom for the entire region.

COUNTER-TERRORISM RESPONSE AND CHALLENGES

1.Deliberate Counter Terrorism (CT) operations continued in earnest across the length and breadth of the continent during the first quarter (Q2) of 2024. In many of the areas affected by terrorism and violent extremism, force deployments carried out several kinetic CT operations with the aim of degrading the capacity of terrorist groups. As a result of the CT operations, several members of militants' groups were either neutralized, eliminated or arrested. Several weapons, arms and ammunitions were also seized by counter terrorism deployments forces. In all, 2, 675 terrorists were eliminated in deliberate CT operations, in addition to the 1,030 killed in reprisal attacks during attacks perpetrated by terrorist groups. This brings the total number of terrorists eliminated within the period to 3,705, 14% higher than those eliminated in the Q1 of 2024.

2. In the **Horn of Africa region**, Government security forces in collaboration with international security deployments including the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the United States Africa Command forces (US-AFRICOM) carried out several air and ground operations targeted at Al-Shabaab operational zones. Regions and areas that were targted for the period include Lower Shabelle, Hiraan, Lower Juba, Bay, Middle Shabelle, Mudug, Galgaduud, Gedo, and Bakool. In these areas, almost 700 terrorists belonging to Al-Shabaab were eliminated. For instance, airstrikes eliminated 50 militants in Baraag Garguurte village near Xarardheere town located within **Mudug** on 07 April. Similarly, 70 Al-Shabaab militants were neutralized on 24 April in the Tabar-Mooge village, near Xarardheere town also located in **Mudug**. On May 07, a coordinated CT operations together with international forces eliminated 70 militants of Al-Shabaab including foreign terrorist fighters in Kuunyo-Barrow near Jilib with Lower Juba. Despite suffering several casualties in CT operations, Al-Shabaab continues to exhibit dexterity and cohesion to plan and launch devastating attacks. A lot of efforts are required to degrade the group's entrenched position within communities, which continue to serve as a source of resilience and resurgence.

3. In the **Sahel Region**, Security forces of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger stepped up deliberate counter terrorism operations aimed at reducing the capabilities of JNIM and ISGS. The period also recorded joint operations between Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger as part of joint efforts for the newly launched Alliance of Sahel States (AES). For the period under review, almost 1,200 suspected terrorists belonging to either JNIM or ISGS were eliminated within the Central Sahel enclave. For instance, at least 30 JNIM militants were killed by Burkinabe security forces in a counter terrorism operation in **Gorassola, Bam on April 12**. On 25 June, **Kokoloukou, Tillaberi**, Niger military carried out an airstrike against JNIM militants. At least 30 militants were killed, and their logistics destroyed. Despite the efforts by the affected countries in the Sahel region, the terrorist groups continue to exhibit great momentum with the capacity of spreading their attacks beyond their traditional operational corridors. Degrading the terrorist groups in the Sahel will require far more than kinetic militaristic operations. Addressing the vulnerabilities of local communities, some of which have become sympathetic to the course of terrorist groups could be a more effective way of building trust between the government and citizenry with the aim of denying terrorist groups their footholds.

4. In the **Lake Chad Basin (LCB),** several counter terrorism operations by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) acting as sectors and collectively as a force dislodged terrorist groups in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Efforts by national armies of the Lake Chad Basin countries also contributed to significantly to further degrading terrorist's groups capabilities in the area. For instance, on **13 April, Koloram, Borno** state in Nigeria, the air component of Operation Hadin Kai conducted an airstrike that targeted ISWAP militants at their hideouts in Kolleram. Over 30 militants including three of their commanders were killed. Similarly, on **30 June,** in **Kaya,** located in the **Lac province** of Chad, the Chadian army, supported by the MNJTF, launched ground, naval and air strikes at ISWAP positions. More than 70 terrorists were killed, and five camps were destroyed. In all, 445 suspected ISWAP militants and 146 Boko Haram fighters were eliminated. Given the work the MNJTF has done in the LCB, sustainability measures are required to keep the terrorism situation at bay. Support for implementation of the LCB stabilisation plan could help sustain the gains

5. In the **Great Lakes region,** SAMIDRC conducted several counter terrorism operations in the Eastern DRC. In **Southern Africa**, the CT operations troops from Rwanda eliminated about 90 suspected ASWJ militants. Withdrawal SAMIM forces begun on Friday the 5th of April 2024, with the departure of Botswana troops marking the beginning of the withdrawal of SAMIM Force.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Since January 2024, Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa have witnessed continuous escalation. This is evident in the complexity and sophisticated attacks and associated fatalities in the Sahel region, the Lake Chad Basin, the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region and now the coastal West African States. A lot of efforts are required at the various theaters of terrorism and violent extremism to reverse the growing trend. With terrorism and violent extremism spreading across Africa at an alarming rate, counter-efforts must consider the socioeconomic drivers of terrorist recruitment, challenges posed by climate change and terrorist propaganda and radicalisation. There is a need for greater support in the fight against the evolving threat, as well as enhanced cooperation among countries and deployed forces. Also, taking stock of the response generation thus far, and reassessing the counter terrorism measures deployed over the years could be the basis of re-strategizing to decisively counter the growing threats of terrorism and violent extremism.

2. Based on the analysis, the following recommendations are provided for policy actions:

A. Situation in Northern Cabo Delgado Province of Mozambique: As Southern Africa Development Community Stabilization Mission in Mozambique (SADC SAMIM) ends its deployment mission, sustaining the gains made alongside Rwandan and Mozambican troops remains a concern. While SAMIM could not completely root out terrorism and violent extremism in Cabo Delgado, it nevertheless contributed significantly to reducing terrorism escalation and degraded the capacity of the IS liked ASWJ militants. The data shows that even before SAMIM completely withdraws, 2024 has seen resurgence of terrorism and violent extremism attacks and associated fatalities. As of 31 June 2024, attacks have more than doubled and deaths quadruple when compared to same period last year (2023). The fear is that if counter terrorism efforts are not sustained, following the exit of SAMIM, terrorism and violent extremism could further resurged, and the entire Southern Africa region could bear the brunt. Mozambique requires international, continental and regional support, both in terms of financial, logistical and solidarity to completely root out the remnant of ASWJ terrorism. In addition, proper cooperation among the troops left on the ground will be required to sustain the gains. While continuing the kinetic deployment is key, this must be implemented in tandem with local community level initiatives that address the root causes of radicalization and recruitment as well as addressing the vulnerabilities and socioeconomic conditions of the local population which serve as drivers of recruitment.

B. The Need to Reinforce the Capacity of Regional and National Organizations for Early Warning, Early Response, and Conflict Prevention: Across the continent and in many countries I the eye of the storm of terrorism and violent extremism, the ability to predict, detect, pre-empt, and prevent the occurrence of terrorism and violent extremism incidents are weak. This is basically due to the lack of existence of effective early warning, early response, conflict prevention mechanisms, and peace infrastructure in local communities. Building the requisite capacity and resourcing continental institutions with mandate of early warning and early response could be the first step towards a workable framework that could help anticipate and pre-empt terrorist attacks. In this regard, logistical and financial resources and appropriate provision of budgetary support to the African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) whose mandate include developing counter terrorism early warning indicators to server as alerts and prevention could bolster continental CT efforts. There is also a need to re-visit the AU continental structural conflict prevention framework, which provides guidance for Country Structural Vulnerability and Resilience Assessment (CSVRA) as well as Country Structural Vulnerability Mitigation Strategy (CSVMS) as key conflict prevention tools that could help reduce the risks vulnerabilities and local context specific grievances for terrorist recruitment.

C. Severing the Ties between Transnational Organized Crimes (TNOC) and Terrorism: One key factor sustaining the momentum of terrorism and violent extremism is the continuous access to finance and logistical support by terrorist and violent extremist groups. In an attempt to have access to finance and expand their financing sources and mechanisms, terrorist groups now have linked have with TNOC network groups and their activities are financing operations of terrorist groups. There is the need therefore to effectively implement counter terrorism financing (CTF) measures.

AUCTC/CAUCT

African Union Counter Terrorism Centre
Centre de l'Union Africain pour la lutte Contre le Terrorisme

About The AUCTC:

The African Union Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) formerly African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was established as a structure of the African Union in 2004. The decision to establish the Centre was taken in 2002 as part of the AU Plan of Action (PoA) to Prevent and Combat of Terrorism. In February 2024, the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Head of States and Governments of the African Union changed the name of the Centre from ACSRT to AUCTC. Its primary role is to assist AU member States build their Counter-Terrorism capacities. Its mandate includes the conduct of research, analysis and studies on the terrorism situation and terrorist groups in Africa, maintaining a terrorism database, centralizing information on terrorism and sharing this with AU Member States. The Centre conducts assessment missions to various AU Member States in order to ascertain their Counter-Terrorism capability and compliance with International Legal instruments and then provide advice on what needs to be done. In its capacity building effort, the Centre conducts seminars, workshops, and training sessions in various aspects of Counterterrorism for Member States and facilitates the drafting of their Counter-Terrorism legislation, strategies, and Plans of Action in accordance with human rights requirements.

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